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Abstract—This study sets out to examine the interaction effect of institutions and trade liberalization on economic growth in 
selected African countries using panel data. There is a general discourse that the growth of a country depends on the level of 
investment which can be achieved most times via engaging in trading activities with other countries of the world. International 
trade, on the other hand, is enhanced by the presence of strong institutions. It has been observed that the combination of 
institutions and trade liberalization affect the economic growth of African countries. Finding out which of the institutions 
would best aid international trade and boost growth more is the aim of this study. This study used secondary data of forty 
African countries and employed the Least Square Dummy Variables (LSDV) and the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
econometric techniques for estimation. The major finding of the study revealed that the interaction effect of trade liberalization, 
political and cultural institutions is stronger than the interaction effect of trade liberalization and economic institutions hence 
economic growth tends to be better in the former case than the latter in the selected SSA countries. Therefore, the study 
recommends that attention should be paid to the development of the economic, political, and cultural institutions 
simultaneously by the governments of the African countries. 
Keywords—Interaction Effect, Trade Liberalization, Institutions, Economic Growth, Africa 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Economic growth is a sustained expansion of production 
possibilities measured as the increase in real Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) over a given period of time [1]. The role of 
trade in economic growth and development is significant. 
The Classical and Neo-classical economists attached so 
much importance to international trade in a country‘s 
development that they regarded it as an ‗engine of growth‘. 
International trade increases savings and investment, reduces 
unemployment and under-employment, enhances greater 
backward and forward linkages in the economy and ensures 
a larger inflow of factor inputs into the economy and 
outflow of goods and services. Trade liberalization has been 
defined as a move towards freer trade through the reduction 
of tariff and other barriers and is generally perceived as the 
major driving force behind globalization [2]. The Neo-
classical economists believed that the economic growth of a 
country depends on the level of investment [3]. Other 
scholars brought the concept of endogenous growth into the 
debate [4,5]. This was made more popular in the work of 
Mankiw, Romer and Weil that made human capital relevant 
to economic growth. Both the classical economists and the 
endogenous growth theorists seem to assume the institutions 
in countries affect economic activities. However, the 
insufficient benefits that accrue to developing countries from 
the global world suggest that there is more to economic 
growth and trade than implied by the neo-classical 
economists [6,7,8]. 
 
According to [9], institutions are the humanly devised 
constraints that structure and control political, economic and 
social interactions amongst various economic agents. They 
consist of both informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, 
customs, traditions and codes of conduct); and formal rules 
(constitutions, laws, property rights). They are a set of 
economic, political and social factors, rules, beliefs, values 
and organizations that jointly motivate regularity in 
individual and social behaviour [10]. They are of three types 
viz; economic, political and social. Economic institutions are 
essential for economic growth in any country due to their 
influence in shaping incentives for various economic actors 
in a society. They do not only determine the level of 
economic growth potential of a country, they also determine 
the distribution of resources and economic gains in the 
country. Political institutions, on the other hand, deal with 
the way the political structure in a country influences the 
behaviour of agents especially with regards to the 
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distribution of political power - de jure and de facto 
[9,11,12,13].  
 
There is a wide spread belief that the combination of 
institutions and trade liberalization can affect the economic 
growth of African countries. But it is not clear which of the 
combinations whether the combination of trade liberalization 
and economic institution, trade openness and political 
institution or trade liberalization and cultural institution will 
bring about a better economic growth in these countries. 
Hence, this study sets out to examine which of these 
combinations would have a better impact on the economic 
growth of the selected African countries. Thus, the objective 
of this paper is to examine the interactive effect of 
economic, political and cultural institutions and trade 
liberalization on economic growth in selected African 
countries. The hypothesis formulated in this study stated in 
the null form is that: H0:  there is no significant interactive 
effect of economic, political, cultural institutions and trade 
liberalization on economic growth in the selected African 
countries. The remaining part of this paper is structured as 
follows: section II is the literature review and theoretical 
framework. Section III presents the methodology employed 
in this study. Data analysis and discussion are set out in 
section IV, while section V presents the summary of 
findings, recommendations and conclusion of the study. 
 
2. Literature Review and Theoretical Framework 
 
Without doubt, there is enough theoretical foundation that 
supports the fact that trade liberalization does influence 
institutions. For instance, [9] emphasized the role of market 
size and technology in engendering institutional change over 
time. It is widely accepted that both market size and 
technology are influenced by trade. Hence, trade 
liberalization can bring about institutional change. [14] 
showed that trade liberalization affects domestic political 
alignments through changes in factor prices. [15] opined that 
trade induces institutional change by strengthening 
commercial interests. [11] showed that trade induces 
institutional change through the transfer of skill-based 
technology which increases the income share of the middle 
class. The ‗critical juncture‘ results are also related to 
[16,17,18,19,20], and many others who find evidence in 
favour of the historical origin of institutional divergence 
across countries. 
 
The origin of trade in the early forms of economies was 
conceived of as local exchange within a small community. 
Trade usually expands beyond this kind of community scene 
to the region and longer distances and eventually to the rest 
of the world.  
 
At each developmental stage, economies have elements of 
increasing specialization, division of labour and more 
efficient technological usage. This story of gradual evolution 
from local autarky to specialization and division of labour 
was derived from the German historical school of thought 
[21]. Specialization is elementary whereby self-reliance is 
one of the key features of most individuals. As trade 
continues to expand, the likelihood for conflicts over the 
exchange of values becomes a source of concern- an issue 
that has to be considered before engaging in trade. The size 
of the market increased and transaction costs also increased 
markedly due to the multifaceted social networks that exist. 
In this case, more resources have to be employed in order to 
enforce rules and orders for effective trade to take place. In 
the absence of a state that can enforce contracts; religious 
and cultural beliefs can also exert some measure of standards 
for the conduct of those involved in the process. However, 
their effectiveness in lowering the costs of transaction 
depends on the degree to which the laid down guidelines 
were adhered to [22,23,24]. 
 
The growth of long distance trade usually poses two distinct 
transaction cost problems namely; the traditional problem of 
agency – the costliest of measuring performance where the 
influence of kingship determines the outcome of such 
agreements (or contracts). As the size and volume of trade 
expands, the problems of ‗agencification‘ would become a 
significant constraint to trade. The second problem consists 
of contract negotiation and enforcement where there is no 
readily accessible way to achieve agreements and ensure 
contract enforcements. Negotiation and enforcement with 
other parts of the world involve the development of 
standardized weights and measures, units of account, a 
medium of exchange, merchant law courts and enclaves of 
foreign merchants, among others [9,25,26].  
 
The theoretical base of this study is premised on the New 
Institutional Economics (NIE) theory, a new development in 
economic thought based on institutional economics and 
some of the principles of Neo-classical economics [12]. It 
has been applied in varying contexts. For instance, it can be 
engaged as non-technologically determined controls that can 
influence social interactions by providing the incentives to 
maintain regularity in human behaviour in historical 
comparative institutional analysis, [27]. The NIE theory 
posits that economic activities that individuals engage in can 
be influenced by some social and legal relationships that 
exist among them. Hence, NIE embraces other areas outside 
the immediate domain of economics like politics, science 
and sociology as well as the interaction these can exert on 
economic outcomes. This is what makes institutions to be an 
area of economics that has made economics more closely in 
touch with other social science disciplines as they can be 
subjected to economic analysis. The basic assumptions of 
New Institutional Economics (NIE) that relates to trade are 
three folds assumptions on individuals, assumptions on how 
and why individuals engage in contract; and assumptions on 
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how individuals govern collective action [12]. In all the 
assumptions, the essential point is that there should be some 
mechanism that regulates the participants‘ behaviour, as 
individuals can be opportunistic at times that could result to 
moral hazards [28]. Though some of the assumptions of NIE 
have been criticized especially with regards to institutional 
change and predictability; it is still very relevant when 
assessing the roles institutions play in economic relations in 
particular and human relations in general.  
 
This study is also based on the theory of comparative 
advantage. All countries gain from trade through 
specializing in the production and export of goods in which 
they are relatively most efficient and importing the rest of 
their requirements from other countries that can produce 
them at a relatively lower cost. The result is that a given 
level of output can be produced more cheaply for all 
countries participating in international trade and invariably 
more employment is generated. Two major extensions of 
this standard proposition, namely the Hecksher-Ohlin model 
and Stolper-Samuelson theorem are used to explain 
comparative advantage. The basis for international trade 
arises not because of inherent technological differences in 
labour productivity for different products between different 
countries, but because countries are endowed with different 
factor supplies, [29].  
 
3. Methodology 
The model specified in this study is analyzed using two 
estimation techniques namely; Least Square Dummy 
Variable (LSDV) technique and the Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM). The choice of the LSDV technique stems 
from the fact that in the LSDV, all observations are pooled 
together but each cross-sectional observation has its own 
heterogeneous intercept dummy variable. Since this study 
used panel data, the LSDV reveals the slope coefficient 
peculiar to all the countries and do not take note of the 
individual characteristics of each entity. STATA 11.0 
statistical software was used to analyze the data.  
 
3.0 Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
There are two major complications arising from estimating 
the dynamic panel data regression model using 
macroeconomic panel data. First, the presence of 
endogenous and/or predetermined covariates, and second, 
the small time-series and cross-sectional dimensions of the 
typical panel data set. The dynamic panel data regression 
model is in fact further characterized by some sources of 
persistence over time. There is the problem of 
autocorrelation which is due to the presence of a lagged 
dependent variable among the regressors and the other is the 
problem of heteroskedasticity [30]. Therefore, to resolve 
these shortcomings and to make the results of the estimation 
better, the use of the Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM) estimation technique is imperative. This approach 
estimates the model parameters directly from the moment 
conditions that are imposed by the model. These conditions 
can be linear in the parameters or non-linear. This is used 
because of the possibility of endogeneity and omitted 
variable bias. The variables that involve institutions may be 
endogenous and usually have limited time variation. 
 
3.1 Model Specification 
The model for this study is adapted from the work of [31,32]. For the purpose of this study, the model is specified as:
 
                                                                               (3.1) 
Stating equation (3.1) in econometric form gives: 
                                                                            
                                                                                                                                               (3.2) 
 
where; β0 is the intercept. The βi‘s, i = 1- 7, being 
coefficients. When β5…β7 > 0 (there is interaction effect); 
β5…β7 < 0 (there is no interaction effect). The Apriori, 
β1…β7 are expected to be positively related to economic 
growth, the dependent variable.  
 
Gkap: gross fixed capital formation (proxy for capital or 
investment); Lab: employment to population ratio (proxy for 
labour); Open: degree of openness (measure of trade 
liberalization); Hkap: human capital (proxied by primary and 
secondary school enrolments); Reprisk: repudiation risk 
(proxy for contracting institutions – this measures contract 
enforcement between private citizens, the measure operates 
on an eleven point scale ranging from 0 to 10 with a high 
score implying better contracting institutions); Cim: contract 
intensive money (proxy for political institutions - Cim 
measures the extent of democracy and property rights, these 
influence the accessibility and willingness of economic 
agents to exercise property rights); Ethsion: ethnic tensions 
(proxy for cultural institutions – ethnic tension measures the 
relative peace in a country and is measured on a 0-6 scale, 
with higher values implying lower ethnic tension). 
Open*Reprisk; Open*Cim and Open*Ethsion are the new 
variables introduced into the growth equation. These new 
variables are obtained thus; they are the products of the 
degree of trade openness and the estimated values of the 
institutional variables viz; repudiation risk, contract 
intensive money and ethnic tensions respectively. For each 
of the institutional variable, the mean value was used as a 
yardstick, any value above this mean value is ascribed 1 and 
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any value below the mean value is ascribed 0. It is this 
binary variable that is then used to multiply the trade 
liberalization variable (degree of trade openness) that gave 
us the new variable. When the coefficient of the new 
variable is greater than 0, there is an interaction effect 
between trade liberalization and institutions while if is less 
than 0, there is no interaction effect between trade 
liberalization and institutions. 
 Expressing equation (3.2) as a linear panel data model gives: 
                                                                                    
                       
                                                                                                                                      (3.3) 
Since the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) technique will not 
yield consistent estimate for panel data, we used the Least 
Square Dummy Variable (LSDV) technique to take care of 
the inherent deficiency in the usage of OLS. However, the 
limitations of the LSDV includes; (i) there is the degrees of 
freedom problem arising from introducing too many dummy 
variables; (ii) the problem of multicollinearity arising from 
too many variables, both individual and multiplicative, this 
makes precise estimation of one or more parameters 
difficult; and (iii) the LSDV may not be able to identify the 
impact of time invariant variables. Due to these limitations, 
this study introduced the concept of dynamic panel data 
[33]. As a result of this, the study assumed that there is a 
connection between the level of growth experienced in a 
country in the preceding year with that of the current level, 
that is, the level of growth achieved in the previous year has 
a link with the level of growth that the country would attain 
in the current year. In other words, there is integrated growth 
in the country. This is particularly necessary because the 
economy is assumed not to exist in isolation; there are 
interconnections among the various sectors in the economy, 
hence, the economic activities in the preceding year have a 
bearing with current economic activities. This is why the 
dynamic panel data is used in this study to estimate this link, 
and this will be estimated using the Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM) estimation technique[24].
 
Expressing equation (3.3) as a linear dynamic panel data model we have: 
                                                                                
                                                                                                                                                                           
                                                                                                                                      (3.4)  
where; i = 1, 2… 40 (countries); t = 1, 2… 35 (years). i 
=1,...,N , t = 2,…,T; ε is the error term. The coefficients 
β1… β8 are coefficients. β0 is the intercept. Apriori, the 
coefficients β1… β8 are positively related with the 
dependent variable, economic growth (Grgdp). 
 
Equation (3.4) can be decomposed into three to show the 
interaction effects of trade liberalization and economic, 
political and cultural institutions on economic growth 
respectively. We express these as equations (3.5), (3.6) and 
(3.7) as follows: 
                                                                                    
(3.5) 
                                                                                         
                                                                                                                                           (3.6) 
                                                                                           
(3.7) 
 
3.2 Data Sources  
This study employed data covering forty (40) African 
countries over a thirty-five year period; comprising both 
time series and cross-sectional data. These forty (40) 
countries were selected based on the World Bank‘s (2007) 
classification of countries into ‗moderately outward-
oriented‘, ‗moderately inward-oriented‘ and ‗strongly 
inward-oriented countries‘. In addition, they are all 
developing countries and belong to the African continent.  
(The list of selected countries is highlighted in the 
Appendix). The data for gross fixed capital formation, 
human capital, real gross domestic product, labour are 
sourced from the World Bank‘s World Development 
Indicators (WDI), while repudiation risk, contract intensive 
money and ethnic tension are sourced from the International 
Country Risk Guide (ICRG). The time frame for the data 
covers 1981 to 2015,  an era that witnessed the introduction 
of trade policy regimes and economic reforms such as the 
introduction of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) in 
some of the African countries [34,35].  
 
4. Data Analysis and Discussion 
 
The starting point of the analysis is to determine the 
stationarity condition of the time series variables using panel 
unit root test. The panel unit test can be carried out on a 
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pooled data when two conditions are met; first, the time 
series and cross-sectional observations must be more than 
fifteen years each and second, the panel must be balanced, 
that is, there should not be any missing data. This study met 
these two conditions. The null and alternative hypotheses 
are formulated as: 
H0: All panels contain unit roots. 
H1: At least one panel is stationary. 
Equations (3.5), (3.6) and (3.7) were analysed to obtain the 
results presented in Tables 1, 2 and 3 below. The rule of 
thumb for decision making under panel unit root test 
involves the rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1 percent 
statistical significance level. The results presented in Table 1 
are the panel unit root tests of the variables. It reveals that 
all the variables used in the growth model are statistically 
significant at 1 percent. Therefore, we reject  
the null hypothesis.
 
Table 1: Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) Unit Root Test Results at Levels 
Variables Chi-squared Statistic Remark 
Grgdp 208.02
***
 (0.0000) Stationary 
Grgdpt-1 212.03
***
 (0.0000) Stationary 
Gkap  144.07
**
 (0.0034) Stationary 
Lab 135.44
***
 (0.0086) Stationary 
Open 124.04
***
 (0.0000) Stationary 
Hkap 180.07 
***
 (0.0002) Stationary 
Open*Reprisk 245.37
***
 (0.0000) Stationary 
Open*Cim 129.67
**
 (0.0322) Stationary 
Open*Ethsion 90.51
** 
 (0.0275) Stationary 
 Number of panels: 40 
 Number of periods: 35 
Source: Estimated by the Authors, 2017. Probability values are displayed in parentheses beside the chi-squared coefficients.
 
 
Note: 
***
 - significant at 1 percent, 
**
 - significant at 5 percent. 
 
Table 2 shows the result of Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) 
test for multicollinearity. The results showed that all the 
variables have VIF values less than 10 and 1/VIF greater 
than 0.10 which is the ideal condition for no 
multicollinearity among variables. Thus, there is no 
multicollinearity among the explanatory variables.
 
Table 2: Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) Test for Multicollinearity 
 
Variable                VIF    1/VIF     
Grgdp               7.85   0.1273 
Grgdpt-1               7.15   0.1396 
Gkap              3.01         0.3334 
Lab              2.08     0.4820 
Open              1.86   0.5396 
Hkap              1.72   0.5866 
Open*Reprisk      1.64   0.6187 
Open*Cim           1.46              0.6969 
Open*Ethsion      1.27  0.7987 
Mean VIF 2.94 
Source: Estimated by the Authors, 2017. 
 
The results in Table 3 present the step-wise estimates of our 
models. Equation (3.5) was estimated to examine the 
interaction effect between trade liberalization and economic 
institutions and the results are presented as regression I. 
Equation (3.6) was estimated to examine the interaction 
effect between trade liberalization and political institutions 
and the results are presented as regression II. Lastly equation 
(3.7) was estimated to examine the interaction effect 
between trade liberalization and cultural institutions and the 
results are presented as regression III. The results showed 
that all the variables are statistically significant and have 
varying magnitudes on economic growth. The results also 
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revealed that the adjusted R
2
 are 0.281, 0.285 and 0.284 in 
regressions I, II and III respectively. This suggests that 
independent variables in the model explain 28.1 percent, 
28.5 percent and 28.4 percent variations in the dependent 
variable, Grgdp respectively. The F-statistic results showed 
that the estimates are statistically significant at 1 percent. 
The result also revealed that the coefficient of Open*Reprisk 
is -0.228 (which is less than 0) while the coefficients of 
Open*Cim and Open*Ethsion are 0.237 and 0.370 (which 
are greater than 0) respectively. This implies that there is no 
interaction effect between trade liberalization and economic 
institutions while there is an interaction effect between trade 
liberalization and political and cultural institutions. 
 
Therefore, we conclude that the impact of trade 
liberalization on economic growth is more significant when 
strong political and cultural institutions are involved; and 
less significant when strong economic institutions are 
involved. Also, since the results of the interactions between 
trade liberalization and political institutions are not too far 
from the interaction effect between trade liberalization and 
cultural institutions, we conclude that both political and 
cultural institutions are important. Hence, there is a need for 
the African countries to have strong political, cultural and 
economic institutions. The implication of these observed 
interaction effects  is that international trade among 
countries seem to be affected more by strong political and 
cultural institutions than strong economic institutions. 
Hence, relative peace and political stability of the African 
countries encourage trading activities to take place among 
the countries and with other countries of the world. 
 
Table 4 presents the system GMM estimates of our model 
presented in Equation (3.2).The system GMM estimator is 
categorized into one-step and two-step options. The results 
in Table 4 begin with some diagnostic tests. The starting 
point assumes that, the individual errors are serially 
uncorrelated for the system GMM estimators for consistent 
estimations. The presence of autocorrelation will indicate 
that lags of the dependent variable (and any other variables 
used as instruments that are not strictly exogenous), are in 
fact endogenous, hence bad instruments. [36] develop a test 
for this phenomenon that would potentially render some lags 
invalid as instruments. Of course, the disturbance     is 
presumed autocorrelated because it contains fixed effects, 
and the estimators are designed to eliminate this source of 
trouble. 
 
The Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation is applied to the 
differenced residuals to purge the unobserved and perfectly 
autocorrelated individual errors. These results are reported 
as AR(1), AR(2) and AR(3) in the lower portion of Table 4. 
The AR(1) is the only one out of the three that  is valuable 
and useful in determining the validity of the estimates. The 
AR(1) must be significant at 5 percent, but it is not 
mandatory that AR(2) and AR(3) must be significant, 
although if they are significant it adds to the validity of the 
estimates. The null hypothesis here that 
   (            )    for k = 1, 2 and 3 is rejected at 5 
percent level if p     . This null hypothesis implies that 
the standard errors are consistent. If     are serially 
uncorrelated, then the null hypothesis of no serial correlation 
will be rejected at AR(1) but not at higher orders. In Table 4, 
it can be concluded that there is no evidence of serial 
correlation at 1percent level of significance since AR(1) is 
significant in the one-step and two-step GMM. Given these 
results, the estimates can be regarded as consistent. 
 
Still on the results in Table 4, the next diagnostic test is a 
test of over-identifying restrictions of whether the 
instruments, as a group, appear exogenous. This test of 
instrument validity is a comparison of the number of 
instruments used in each case and the related number of 
parameters. It is implemented by the Sargan and Hansen J 
tests. The Sargan and Hansen J tests are used to test if the 
instruments as a group are exogenous. The test is carried out 
to either accept or reject the null hypothesis that states that 
the instruments as a group are exogenous. The higher the p-
value of the Sargan statistic, the better. For one-step, non-
robust estimation, the Sargan statistic which is the 
minimized value of the one-step GMM criterion function is 
applicable. The Sargan statistic in this case is, however, not 
robust to autocorrelation. So for one-step, robust estimation 
(and for all two-step estimation), the xtabond2 (STATA 
command) also reports the Hansen J statistic, which is the 
minimized value of the two-step GMM criterion function, 
and is robust to autocorrelation. In addition, xtabond2 still 
reports the Sargan statistic in these cases because the 
Hansen J test has its own problem: it can be greatly 
weakened by instrument proliferation. 
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Table 3: Interaction Effect Estimation Results 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE – MEASURE OF ECONOMIC GROWTH (Grgdp) 
VARIABLE REGRESSION I 
 LSDV                   Pooled 
OLS   
REGRESSION II 
 LSDV                  Pooled OLS  
REGRESSION III 
LSDV                 Pooled OLS                
Gkap 0.383
***
  [6.09]      0.297
***
 
[5.22]            
(0.000)                   (0.000) 
0.381
***   
[6.05]      0.292
*** 
[5.25] 
(0.000)                   (0.000) 
0.381
***
[6.06]     0.284
***  
  
[5.26] 
(0.000)                  (0.000)      
Hkap 0.283
**     
[1.83]      0.098
* 
   
[1.69]  
(0.068)                 (0.098) 
0.274
*      
[1.78]      0.096
**    
[2.25] 
(0.076)                  (0.011)      
0.284
*    
[1.79]     0.087
** 
    
[2.26] 
(0.077)                 (0.011) 
Lab 0.256
**    
[2.59]      0.412
***
 
[2.84]  
 (0.021)                  (0.001) 
0.588
***   
[2.52]      0.211
***  
[2.84]  
(0.001)                (0.003) 
0.611
***
 [2.53]     0.199
*** 
   
[2.85] 
(0.002)                  (0.003) 
Open 0.053
*    
[1.63]        0.024
**
  
[2.19]     
(0.094)                   (0.022)    
0.080
*
    [1.71]     0.076
* 
   
[1.74] 
(0.092)                (0.085) 
0.082
*  
[1.73]        0.078
*  
    
[1.76] 
(0.093)                   (0.086) 
Open*Reprisk -0.228
**
  [2.65]     -0.046
*
  
[1.90] 
(0.014)                  (0.067) 
      -                           -     -                                 - 
Open*Cim -                        -       0.237*  [1.96]      0.343**  [2.03] 
(0.092)                 (0.047)   
    -                                 - 
Open*Ethsion     -                             -  -                       - 0.370*    [1.74]         0.272**  
[2.06] 
(0.094)                      (0.048)  
Constant 8.433
**
  [2.09]      2.127
** 
 
[2.08] 
(0.030)                  (0.033)  
0.455
**
  [2.09]      2.177
*** 
[2.11] 
(0.026)                  (0.009) 
0.465
**
   [2.11]       2.159
***  
 
[2.13] 
(0.028)                      (0.008) 
R
2
 
Adjusted R
2 
F-stat 
Country 
Dummy 
No of 
Countries 
Number of 
Observations 
0.329                     0.192 
0.281                     0.177 
5.62 (0.000)       6.27 (0.000)                  
Yes                        No 
 
 
40                       40 
 
1400                   1400 
0.329                    0.193 
0.285                    0.187 
5.58 (0.000)        6.29  (0.000)                      
Yes                       No  
 
 
40                      40  
 
1400              1400 
0.331                         0.203 
0.284                         0.187  
5.57  (0.000)        6.29  (0.000)  
Yes                              No 
 
 
40                              40 
  
1400                         1400         
 
Source: Estimated by the Authors, 2017. Notes: Regression I are the results for the interaction effect of trade openness and 
economic institutions; regression II are the results for the interaction effect of trade openness and political institutions; 
regression III are the results for the interaction effect of trade openness and cultural institutions respectively. * - significant at 
10 percent; ** - significant at 5 percent; *** - significant at 1 percent. 
 
Only the respective p-values are reported for this test results 
in the lower part of Table 4. Here, the null hypothesis that 
the population moment condition is valid is not rejected if 
        The summary statistics indicate that the one-step 
and two-step system GMM dynamic panel models of the 
selected fortyAfrican countries have 40 instruments and 11 
parameters each. This represents a total of 19 over-
identifying restrictions in each case. The number of 
instruments satisfies the rule that says that the number of 
instruments should be less or equal to the number of groups. 
In this study, we have thirty-five sampled countries. In both 
specifications, the Hansen–J statistic does not reject the 
Over-Identifying Restrictions (OIR), thus confirming that 
the instrument set can be considered valid. The Sargan test 
is significant at 5 percent. The F-statistic obtained are 
considerably not satisfactory because the result in each case 
is not significant at one, five and ten percents. This is 
indicative that all the exogenous variables do not jointly 
explain significantly, the economic growth process across 
the sampled African countries over the study period. 
 
The results in Table 4 also showed that all the coefficients of 
the explanatory variables are positive and the estimates are 
consistent with theoretical expectations. The Blundell–Bond 
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(system-GMM) robust estimates indicate that the lagged 
growth value (first lag) is correctly signed and statistically 
significant across the sampled African countries. In other 
words, past realizations of economic growth do produce 
some significant impact on the current level of economic 
growth. The stock of capital proxied by gross fixed capital 
formation showed a very interesting result in the Blundell–
Bond robust estimates. One striking observation here is that 
the stock of capital produced a positive impact on economic 
growth across the sampled countries over the study period. 
This variable is also statistically significant at the 5 percent 
level in the one-step and two–step system GMM options. 
This result supports the apriori expectation. It is, therefore, 
expected that capital stock would have a positive impact on 
economic growth in the selected economies. Theoretically, 
the implication of this result is that investment is expected to 
increase in these African countries which would improve on 
the economic growth of these economies.  In terms of the 
degree of trade openness (Open) variable, it had the 
expected positive sign and is statistically significant at 5 
percent. A 1 percent change in the degree of trade openness 
under the two–step system GMM estimates brings about a 
greater proportionate change in economic growth across the 
study group. The implication of this is that international 
trade plays an important role in the growth of the selected 
African countries. 
 
In terms of the interaction effect of institutions and trade 
liberalization on economic growth, the results showed that 
the interaction effect of political and cultural institutions and 
trade liberalization have a better influence on economic 
growth than the interaction effect of economic institution 
and trade liberalization on economic growth. Although, their 
coefficients are correctly signed, they all have positive 
impact on economic growth of the sampled African 
countries. The implication of this interaction effects between 
trade liberalization and institutions is that international trade 
among countries seem to be affected more by strong 
political and cultural institutions than strong economic 
institutions. Relative peace and political stability in these 
African countries encourage trading activities to take place 
among the countries and with other nations 
of the world.
  
Table 4: GMM Estimation Results 
Dependent Variable – Grgdp 
                                                 SYSTEM-GMM                                            
Regressors                        One-step                  Two-step                 
                                          Collapsed                Collapsed 
(1)                               (2)                                                                   
Grgdp(-1)                  0.268
***
 (0.000)            0.198
***
  (0.000)               
-                                       
Gkap                         0.441
**
  (0.045)             0.480
**
    (0.042)              
Hkap                         0.161
*
   (0.083)             0.140
**
  (0.037)           
Lab                            0.084
**
  (0.045)            0.172
**
  (0.040)           
Open                          0.281
**
   (0.047)          0.130
**
  (0.048)           
Open*Reprisk            0.167
**
  (0.011)           0.178
**
   (0.034)          
Open*Cim                  0.294
**
  (0.026)           0.246
**
  (0.029)           
Open*Ethsion             0.182
**
  (0.081)          0.187
**
  (0.028)                       
Constant                     0.299
**
   (0.027)        -1.426
***
 (0.006)           
No. of Instruments             35                                35                                                                                                                                                                    
Country Effects                 No                               No                                 
F-stat (Wald χ2 )             66.41                          1544.32                  
F-stat (p-value)              [0.000]                         [0.000]                                     
AR(1)                            [0.000]                         [0.001]                    
AR(2)                            [0.967]                         [0.771]                    
AR(3)                               -                                [0.541]                  
No of Observations         1042                           1042                                                 
Sargan Test (OIR)         [0.045]                        [0.045]                  
Hansen Test (OIR)            -                               [0.726]                   
Number of Countries       40                                  40                                                       
 
Source: Estimated by the Authors. 
Notes: The standard errors are robust and consistent in the presence of any pattern of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. 
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5. Summary of Findings, Recommendations and 
Conclusion 
 
This section presents the summary of major findings of the 
study, the recommendations made and the conclusion, with a 
view to examining the interaction effect of institutions and 
trade liberalization on the economic growth of selected 
African countries. 
 
5.1 Summary of Findings 
The main findings of the study are enumerated below: 
1. The study found out that there is a significant positive 
impact of the trade liberalization variable – degree of trade 
openness on economic growth of the selected African 
countries. The implication of this is that international trade is 
positively beneficial to a country especially if the country is 
an exporter of goods and services rather than being just an 
importer of goods and services. It would be beneficial 
economically if the governments of these countries should 
embark on policies that will boost industrialization to 
increase the level of output and as a result increase their 
levels of exports. 
2. The study also found out that trade liberalization is 
enhanced more when strong political and cultural institutions 
are in place than strong economic institutions Peace and 
economic stability encourage international trade.  
3. The result on the stock of capital variable – Gross Fixed 
Capital Formation showed that capital is very important in 
determining the interaction effect of institutions and trade 
liberalization on economic growth in the selected African 
countries. Though, capital has significant positive impacts 
on the three interaction effects, but it has a higher positive 
impact in the interaction of trade liberalization and economic 
institutions than that of trade liberalization and political / 
cultural institutions This supports theoretical expectation 
which postulates a significant influence of capital on 
economic growth.  
4. Furthermore, education which is a measure of human 
capital development is found to exhibit positive influence on 
economic growth in the selected African countries. This 
supports theoretical assertion of a positive relationship 
between education and economic growth. Also, human 
capital growth is believed to be important in the 
determination of the quality of institutions [37]. The 
implication of this finding is that though human capital plays 
a vital role in improving the level of economic growth; the 
story among the sampled African countries used in this study 
seems to be different empirically; human capital has not had 
a great impact on institutional quality.  
5. Finally, this study also found out that the preceding level 
of GDP (Grgdpt-1) has a negative relationship with economic 
growth which supports what theory asserts [4,38]. The result 
also reveal that the preceding level of growth has significant 
negative impact in the three interaction effects of trade 
liberalization and institutions but least negative impact is 
seen in the interaction effect of trade liberalization and 
cultural institutions. The implication of this is that the 
current level of growth must surpass the preceding year‘s 
level of growth. The governments of these African countries 
should strive to achieve this.  
 
5.2 Recommendations 
Based on the findings noted above, the following 
recommendations are made by the study:  First, since human 
capital plays a crucial role in boosting economic growth in 
the selected African countries, the study strongly 
recommends that the government should find ways that will 
be geared towards improving the stock of human capital in 
the African continent. Some of these include the training and 
retraining of experts such as lawyers, economists, 
accountants, among others, in the African countries and their 
respective ministries such as trade, justice, commerce and 
industry. This is because a well-informed and trained crop of 
persons that control policy formulation and implementation 
in these institutions are essential. This is most crucial in this 
21
st
 century era which is mostly knowledge-driven.  
 
Second, it is also recommended that there is a need to ensure 
that contracts are made easily enforceable. This is a very 
important tool that can be used to improve international 
trade in the African countries. If effective contract 
enforcement procedures are in place, transaction costs will 
be reduced and this will eventually improve the level of 
trade openness in the sub-region.  Third, the study also 
recommends that there is a need for the selected African 
countries to keep improving on their level of growth 
annually by ensuring that they surpass the growth level of 
the preceding year. One of the ways this can be done is for 
these countries to embark on export promotion strategies 
that will make them exporting countries rather just being 
importing countries. When this is done, they will earn 
foreign exchange that will be used for investment purposes. 
Lastly, the study recommends that the governments in these 
African countries should develop the economic, political and 
cultural institutions simultaneously. This is achievable when 
the relevant authorities in a country develop an environment 
in which fair and predictable rules form the basis for 
economic, political and social interactions.  
 
5.3 Conclusion 
This study examined the interaction effect of institutions and 
trade liberalization on economic growth in selected African 
countries. In order to contribute to existing knowledge, this 
study used a sample of forty (40) countries in Africa for the 
period 1981-2015 to empirically evaluate which 
combinations of economic, political, cultural institutions and 
trade liberalization will have better effect on economic 
growth in the selected African countries. . The major 
findings from this study revealed that the interaction of 
political and cultural institutions with trade openness have 
significant impact on economic growth, than that of 
economic institutions and trade liberalization. For these 
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African countries to harness maximum gains from 
international trade, there must be strong institutions. 
Therefore, there is a need for the governments of these 
African countries, especially the sampled countries to 
develop strong institutions in order to ensure the  
vigorous growth of their economies.
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Appendix: List of Countries and their identifier (id) 
id      Central                                   id  East and Southern Africa                        id       West  Africa                         North Africa 
2       Angola                                     4   Botswana                                                 3     Benin Republic                       1       Algeria  
5       Burundi                                   12  Djibouti                                                   7     Cape Verde                             13      Egypt 
6       Cameroon                               15   Ethiopia                                                  11    Cote d‘Ivoire                          22     Libya 
8       Central African Republic       20      Kenya                                                  17    Gambia                                   25      Morocco 
9       Chad                                       21      Lesotho                                                18    Ghana                                     38     Tunisia                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
10     Congo                                     23 Madagascar                                               28   Niger                                                                                                                                 
14     Equatorial Guinea                   24  Malawi                                                     29   Nigeria                                                                                      
16     Gabon                                     26 Mozambique                                              31   Senegal                                                                          
19     Guinea                                    27   Namibia                                                    37    Togo                                                                                                
                                                         30  Rwanda                                                                                                                              
                                                         32 Seychelles 
                                                         33 South Africa           
                                                         34   Sudan  
                                                         35  Swaziland                                                                          
                                                         36  Tanzania     
                                                         39   Uganda                                                   
                                                         40  Zambia 
                                                                                                                                                       
Source: UNCTAD (2009) Handbook of Statistics; WTO (2009) International Trade Statistics 
 
 
 
 
